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ORIGINALITY IS A FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT in copyright law: it defines the works to which copyright
attaches and delineates the scope of protection they receive. The Supreme Court of Canada, in its
recent ruling in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, appears to have settled the
conflict between creativity and sweat-of-the-brow standards for originality, espousing a compromise
position requiring “skill and judgment.” In this paper, the author aims to locate the evolution of the
originality doctrine within the context of a foundational shift in Canadian copyright theory. When
“benefiting authors” was copyright’s only recognized purpose, originality was determined with
reference to the author’s rights: the emergence of a creativity threshold in Canada was infused with a
personality-based vision of the author’s rights; the industriousness threshold was informed by a
perceived need to reward an author’s labour. However, the Supreme Court in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art
du Petit Champlain insisted that furthering the public interest in the production and dissemination of
intellectual works is also a primary purpose of copyright. The CCH decision at the Supreme Court
represents the first occasion on which a Canadian court has taken the public interest side of the
copyright “balance” seriously when defining and applying the originality standard. The author argues
that this elevation of public interest considerations provides a more suitable framework for developing
copyright policy, particularly in the “information age.” However, given the case-by-case nature of
originality determinations and the tensions inherent in the Théberge balancing act, the author cautions
that the actual consequences of this development remain to be seen. 
L’ORIGINALITÉ EST UN CONCEPT FONDAMENTAL en droit d’auteur. Il définit l’œuvre protégée par le droit
d’auteur et délimite la portée de la protection accordée à l’œuvre. La Cour suprême du Canada, dans
sa décision récente dans l’affaire CCH Canadian Ltd. c. Barreau du Haut-Canada, semble avoir résolu
le conflit entre les normes de créativité et de travail à la sueur de son front caractérisant l’originalité,
en optant pour une solution de compromis exigeant « du talent et du jugement ». Dans cet article,
l’auteure trace l’évolution de la doctrine d’originalité dans le contexte du changement fondamental de
la théorie canadienne du droit d’auteur. Lorsque les auteurs n’étaient reconnus que pour les fins du
droit d’auteur, l’originalité était déterminée en fonction des droits de l’auteur. La question du seuil de
créativité au Canada s’est posée avec la vision des droits d’auteur fondée sur la personnalité; le seuil
du travail industrieux est né du besoin de récompenser l’auteur pour son labeur. La Cour suprême
insiste, toutefois, dans l’affaire Théberge c. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain, que le développement
de l’intérêt public au moyen de la production et de la dissémination des œuvres intellectuelles
constitue également un des buts principaux du droit d’auteur. Dans l’arrêt CCH de la Cour suprême,
pour la première fois un tribunal canadien tient réellement compte de l’équilibre entre l’intérêt public
et le droit d’auteur dans sa définition et son application la norme d’originalité. L’auteure soutient que
le nouveau poids accordé à l’intérêt public fournit un meilleur cadre de référence pour le
développement de la politique sur le droit d’auteur, en particulier en notre « ère de l’information ».
Néanmoins, étant donné les déterminations au cas par cas de la nature de l’originalité et les tensions
inhérentes au processus d’équilibre énoncé dans l’arrêt Théberge, l’auteure suggère que le temps
nous dira si ce pas en avant se traduira de façon concrète dans l’avenir.
Copyright © 2005 by Carys J. Craig.
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1. INTRODUCTION: ORIGINALITY IN CANADIAN COPYRIGHT CASES
ORIGINALITY IS THE CENTRAL REQUIREMENT of copyright protection. A work is
only protected by copyright if it consists of original expression, and copying will
amount to infringement only if original elements of the protected work are taken.
In this sense, the originality doctrine is responsible for delineating the nature and
the scope of copyright’s subject matter.1 Further, originality is the foundational
concept that defines the relationship between an “author” and her “work”, for
copyright in a work comes into existence at the moment when an author
produces fixed original expression. However, as with many or most of the
foundational concepts in copyright law, the meaning of originality has long been
a matter of doubt and a source of contention.  The debate has evolved around
two prominent schools of thought. On one hand, there is the creativity school, as
endorsed by the US Supreme Court in the famous Feist decision,2 according to
which originality requires that a work not be copied and contain a modicum of
creativity. On the other hand, there is the so-called “sweat of the brow” school,
according to which  mere industrious collection involving the expense of labour
or effort will be sufficient to meet the threshold for protection. 
In recent years, Canadian jurisprudence has swung unpredictably between
the two schools of thought, resulting in uncertainty, confusion and controversy. In
1995, in U & R Tax Services v. H & R Block Canada Inc.,3 the Federal Court assured
us, rather unequivocally, that “[i]ndustriousness (‘sweat of the brow’) as opposed to
creativity is enough to give a work sufficient originality to make it copyrightable.”4
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1. For this reason, David Vaver has described the originality doctrine as “really a proxy for answering the
question: Has the author done enough to justify preventing the world from copying from his or her output
for a century or more?”. David Vaver, “Canada’s Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative
Overview”  (2004) 17 Intellectual Property Journal 125 at p. 141 [Vaver, “Comparative Overview”].
2. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/
cases/499_US_340.htm>, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) [Feist cited to U.S.].
3. (1995), 62 C.P.R. (3d) 257, 97 F.T.R. 259 (FCTD) [U & R Tax Service cited to C.P.R.].
Two years later, in the Tele-Direct case,5 the Federal Court of Appeal assured us,
almost as unequivocally, that we had misunderstood the significance of the U & R
Tax case and others like it, and that the creativity standard was part of the Anglo-
Canadian copyright law (or at least, if it was not, it should have been).6 According
to Tele-Direct, the “sweat of the brow” cases had never stood for the proposition
that labour alone could be determinative of originality. Apparently, “skill, judgment
or labour” had always meant “skill, judgment and labour.”7 If it were otherwise, the
court opined, Canada would not be in compliance with its NAFTA obligations,
which were said to impose standards of intellect and creativity.8 In short, the
Federal Court of Appeal in Tele-Direct purported to declare victory for the
creativity school in the originality “battle.”9
The Tele-Direct case was identified by many as Canada’s endorsement of
a Feist-based approach to originality. Indeed, the court expressly “found
assistance” in the US experience. Several subsequent cases in Canada followed the
Tele-Direct decision,10 and the prevalent expectation at the time seems to have
4. Ibid. at p. 264.
5. Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc. (1997), 2 F.C. 22,
<http://reports.fja.gc.ca/fc/src/shtml/1998/pub/v2/1998fc21425.shtml>, 76 C.P.R. (3d) 296 (FCA) [Tele-
Direct cited to F.C.].
6. Ibid. at para. 17. Décary JA wrote: “All in all, apart from the possible qualifications one might wish to make
with respect to some earlier decisions, I have come to the conclusion that the 1993 amendments did not
alter the state of the law of copyright with respect to compilations of data. The amendments simply
reinforce in clear terms what the state of the law was, or ought to have been: the selection or arrangement
of data only results in a protected compilation if the end result qualifies as an original intellectual creation.”
7. Ibid. at para. 29. Décary JA explained: “It is true that in many of the cases we have been referred to, the
expression “skill, judgment or labour” has been used to describe the test to be met by a compilation in
order to qualify as original and, therefore, to be worthy of copyright protection. It seems to me, however,
that whenever “or” was used instead of “and”, it was in a conjunctive rather than in a disjunctive way. It is
doubtful that considerable labour combined with a negligible degree of skill and judgment will be
sufficient in most situations to make a compilation of data original.”
8. Ibid. at paras. 15, 16. But see Myra Tawfik, “Decompiling the Federal Court of Appeal’s ‘NAFTA Argument’
in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc.—From Facts to Fiction” (2001) 33
Ottawa Law Review 147.
. According to Décary JA in Tele-Direct, supra note 5 at para. 13, “… the addition of the definition of
‘compilation’ in so far as it relates to ‘a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of data’ appears
to me to have decided the battle which was shaping up in Canada between partisans of the ‘creativity’
doctrine—according to which compilations must possess at least some minimal degree of creativity—and
the partisans of the ‘industrious collection’ or ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine—wherein copyright is a reward
for the hard work that goes into compiling facts.” 
10. See e.g. Prism Hospital Software, Inc. v. Hospital Medical Records Institute (1994), 97 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201,
<http://www.canlii.org/bc/cas/bcsc/1994/1994bcsc11222.html>, 57 C.P.R. (3d) 129 (BCSC); ITAL-Press Ltd.
v. Sicoli (1999), 170 F.T.R. 66, <http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/1999/t-2908-94.shtml>, 86 C.P.R. (3d) 129
(FCTD); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2000] 2 F.C. 45,  <http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/1999/t-1618-93.shtml>, (FCTD) [CCH (FCTD) cited to F.C.]; Édutile inc. v. Association pour la
protection des automobilistes, [2000] 4 F.C. 195, <http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/cf/1997/t-1151-96.shtml>,
[2000] 188 D.L.R. (4th) 132 (FCA); B & S Publications, Inc. v. Max-Contacts, Inc. [2001] 287 A.R. 201, A.J.
No. 143 (Q.B.); Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (2004), 72 O.R. 481,
<http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2004/october/C38148.pdf>, [2004] O.J. No. 4029 (Ont CA)
[Robertson cited to O.R.]. Compare Hager v. ECW Press Ltd (1998), [1999] 2 F.C. 287,
<http://reports.fja.gc.ca/fc/1999/pub/v2/1999fc23716.html>, 85 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (FCTD) [Hager cited to
F.C.], where Reed J rejected the argument that Tele-Direct had raised Canada’s originality standard to
require creativity. Notably, Reed J appears implicitly to accept the defendant’s arguments that “reward for
labour” could provide a legitimate basis for copyright protection. Ibid. at para. 39 (citing Lords Davey and
Halsbury in Walter v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539 (HL) [Walter v. Lane]. In line with the discussion that follows, this
divergent theoretical footing might go a long way to explaining Justice Reed’s unease with the Tele-Direct
standard. For a fuller discussion of these cases and their relationship to Tele-Direct, see Daniel Gervais,
“Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law” (2002) 49
Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 949, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i
d=733603>.
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been that Feist or something resembling it would soon become the standard
approach across the common law jurisdictions.11 However, just five years after the
ruling in Tele-Direct, the Federal Court of Appeal clarified its position: if we were
under the impression that it had embraced a creativity standard for Canadian
originality, we had once again been mistaken.12 According to the Federal Court of
Appeal in the CCH case, the only precondition to copyright in Anglo-Canadian law
was that a work be “independently produced and not copied from another
person.”13 Skill, judgment, labour, knowledge and so forth were all possible
indicators or ingredients of originality, but none was required in order for an
independently produced work to receive protection.14 Now, of course, in the latest
twist in this chain of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has overturned the Court
of Appeal’s ruling on originality in CCH, finding that the answer lies in between the
“two extremes” of industriousness and creativity. An original, copyrightable work
“must be more than a mere copy of another work,” but it “need not be creative,
in the sense of being novel or unique.”15 Rather, in order to be protected, an
author’s expression must also involve a more than trivial amount of “skill and
judgment.”16
My aim here is to offer some brief thoughts on the manner in which the
originality doctrine has evolved through this convoluted and contradictory line of
cases. Nowhere is the pull between the extremes of creativity and industry better
illustrated than in the progression of the CCH case from the Trial Division to the
Supreme Court. The history and outcome of this case encapsulates the dynamics
that have shaped Canadian originality jurisprudence over the last ten years. As
such, I will use this case as a platform from which to examine those dynamics and
the significance of the apparent resolution achieved by the Supreme Court in
March 2004. 
11. See Myra Tawfik, “’Aussie Rules’ on the Boundaries of Copyright Protection in Factual Compilations”
(2001) 1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 133, asking at p. 145: “is the Telstra decision [of
the Australian Federal Court] the last great stand of the ‘industrious collection’ school in modern copyright
law?” See also, Gervais, supra note 10 at p. 951: “[A] Feist-like standard is now applied or may soon
emerge in key common law countries.”
12. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2002 FCA 187, <http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca187.html>, [2002] 4 F.C. 213, (2002), 18 C.P.R. (4th) 161 [CCH (FCA) cited to F.C.]:
“[T]he Trial Judge misinterpreted this Court’s decision in Tele-Direct…, and other jurisprudence as shifting
the standard of originality away from the traditional Anglo-Canadian approach.” Ibid. at para. 36: “The
Trial Judge…interpreted Tele-Direct as altering the classic Anglo-Canadian standard of originality and
adding new requirements of ‘imagination’ and ‘creative spark’. In this, he was mistaken.” 
13. Ibid. at para. 36. Note that there was also some doubt about whether this standard was in effect overruling
any creativity standard found in Tele-Direct, or whether Tele-Direct was simply distinguished on its facts. A
possible consequence of this distinction would be a flexible standard of creativity that differs according to
the type of work to be protected. Thus, sub-compilations of routine data may have to meet a higher
originality standard than the kind of “considerably more complex” materials at issue in the CCH and
analogous scenarios. Ibid. at para. 37.   
14. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
15. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-
scc/en/pub/2004/vol1/html/2004scr1_0339.html>, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 at para. 16 [CCH (SCC) cited to
LexUM/S.C.R.].
16. Ibid. “Skill” is defined as: “the use of one’s knowledge, developed aptitude or practised ability in
producing the work.” “Judgment” is defined as: “the use of one’s capacity for discernment or ability to
form an opinion or evaluation by comparing different possible options in producing the work.” The
exercise of such skill and judgment necessarily involves “intellectual effort.” As such, the ruling is, at least
to an extent, an endorsement of Rothstein J’s reasoning at the Court of Appeal that in addition to not
being copied, “some intellectual effort will be necessary in order for a work to qualify as original.” CCH
(FCA), supra note 12 at para. 218. 
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In examining the development of the originality doctrine in Canada, my
intention is to contextualize the formulation and application of the doctrine in
light of the perceived purposes of copyright law, and correspondingly, the
identification of copyright’s intended beneficiaries. My argument is that some
seismic shifting in the theoretical ground underlying copyright has caused the
movement in copyright’s doctrinal structure. From the time that the Trial Division
issued its ruling in CCH until the Supreme Court released the final decision,
copyright in Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence evolved from a right solely
for the benefit of authors17 into a system for achieving a balance between
authors’ rights and the public interest.18 My intention is to contextualize the CCH
case within that shifting paradigm and to understand the divergent approaches
of the various courts against this background. 
My broad contention is that the CCH decision from the Supreme Court
represents the first occasion wherein originality has been shaped with the public
interest (and not simply the author’s rights) in mind. It thus amounts to a
significant advancement in the development of copyright policy by providing a
more suitable framework within which to examine questions of copyrightability
in the so-called “information age.”
*
2. CCH AT THE TRIAL DIVISION: CREATIVITY AND THE AUTHORSHIP MODEL
2.1. Defining Originality: The Creative Spark
THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT TRIAL DIVISION in the CCH case effectively
confirmed and compounded the initial fears generated by the Tele-Direct
decision that a “creativity” standard would elevate the originality threshold
beyond what was reasonable, and would cause judges to become subjective
arbiters of literary value or worth. Refusing to find original expression in reported
judicial decisions, including headnotes, catchlines, parallel citations, and running
heads, Gibson J concluded that such additions “involved extensive labour, skill
and judgment” but “lacked the ‘imagination’ or ‘creative spark’… essential to a
finding of originality.”19 It seems correct that originality in reported judicial
decisions can exist only in a “narrow groove,”20 but given the skill, judgment and
labour involved in selecting and arranging the relevant facts and ratio of a court
decision, these works might more appropriately have been found to meet the
Tele-Direct standard embraced by the court.
Resistance to a creativity standard has often been justified in terms of the
connotations that may be assumed to attach to it. In the US, Melville Nimmer
famously—and successfully—objected to the proposed inclusion of the word
“creative” in the 1976 Act on the ground that the term would suggest a higher
17. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
19. CCH (FCTD), supra note 10 at para. 139. 
20. Ibid. at paras. 133-134. Compare Gervais, supra note 10 at p. 966.
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standard than required, implying the need for some degree of objective novelty.21
In applying the Tele-Direct standard to the case headnotes, in particular, I would
respectfully argue that Gibson J did indeed draw this mistaken inference from the
concept of “creativity” when he implied that skilful faithfulness to the original
material precluded original expression.22 Having denied copyright to many of the
legal publications at issue in the case, and having endorsed a view of creative
originality that required “imagination” and “creative spark” beyond basic skill and
judgment, it seemed clear that the Trial Division’s ruling in the matter was unlikely
to survive on appeal. It was also clear, however, that this overly restrictive
application of the creativity standard had put the standard itself in jeopardy. The
threshold for originality had been raised too high.
2.2. The Purpose of Copyright: Creative Originality and Benefiting Authors
For the purposes of my argument, it is important to examine this originality ruling
in light of the copyright policy assumptions at play. The court began its analysis by
stating what it understood to be the object and the purpose of the Copyright Act:
[T]o benefit authors, albeit that in benefiting authors, it is capable of having a
substantially broader-based public benefit through the encouragement of
disclosure of works for the advancement of learning or, as in this case, the
wider dissemination of law.23
The obvious implication is that any benefit enjoyed by the public as a
result of the protection of the author’s copyright is an incidental, if fortunate, by-
product of upholding the private right. This vision of copyright’s purpose echoed
the position of the Supreme Court of Canada at that time. In the Supreme Court
decision of Bishop v. Stevens, McLachlin J, as she then was, said that “the
Copyright Act . . . was passed with a single object, namely, the benefit of authors
of all kinds...”24
Having thus identified the sole intended beneficiary of the copyright
system as the rights-bearing author, the formulation and application of the
originality standard in the CCH case at trial can be understood in terms of the
court’s explicit author-focus. The search for an appropriate originality standard is
in fact the search for a genuine “author.” 
21. George Grossman, ed. Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History: Copyright Law Revision, part 3
(Buffalo: Hein, 1976) at pp. 42-46, cited in Timothy Young, “Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations:
The White Pages of the Phone Book are Not Original Enough to be Copyrighted—But Why?” (1992) 17
University of Dayton Law Review 631 at p. 656. This concern was in fact raised by the Federal Court of
Appeal in its judgment reversing the Trial Division’s finding on originality: “The fact that an objective and
coherent definition of ‘creative’ is elusive at best and that ‘creativity’ can sometimes connote qualities that
are not required of an ‘original’ work makes it preferable to avoid such unpredictable labels when
assessing originality.” CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 58.   
22. CCH (FCTD), supra note 10 at para. 140, Gibson J wrote: “Here, [regarding the reasons for judgment in
issue],…faithfulness to the original, whether or not in the public domain, is the dominant editorial value
and thus, the creative ‘is the enemy of the true’.”
23. Ibid. at para. 116. 
24. Per McLachlin J, Télé-Métropole Inc. v. Bishop (sub nom. Bishop v. Stevens), [1990] S.C.R. 467, at pp. 478-
479, <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1990/vol2/html/1990scr2_0467.html>, 72 D.L.R.
(4th) 97  [Bishop cited to S.C.R.].
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Arguably, then, the Trial Division’s ruling is best examined through the
lens of a personality-based concept of copyright: original works of authorship are
protected because and to the extent that they manifest or reflect the
personalities or individuality of their authors, embodying their subjective choices
and intellectual energy.25 This argument is reinforced by Gibson J’s approval of
dictum from the Tele-Direct decision. Citing Décary JA,  Gibson J adopts the
author-oriented perspective that seems to have informed the Federal Court of
Appeal’s articulation of a creativity standard in that case:
One should always keep in mind that one of the purposes of the copyright
legislation, historically, has been “to protect and reward the intellectual effort
of the author… in the work”….The use of the word “copyright” in the English
version of the Act has obscured that fact that what the Act fundamentally
seeks to protect is “le droit d’auteur”. While not defined in the Act, the word
“author” conveys a sense of creativity and ingenuity.26
The standard of creative originality that emerged from the Court of
Appeal in the Tele-Direct ruling, which was embraced by Gibson J in the CCH
case at the trial level, can therefore be seen to flow from an attempt to identify
and protect “true authors”—the intended beneficiaries of the Copyright Act.27 A
personality-based theoretical model implies that originality must amount to
more than the mere investment of labour or effort. If originality defines true
authorship, then some personal connection and subjective contribution to the
work is required, for this connection is what underpins the right. While these
decisions were widely regarded as having adopted a Feist-like standard in
Canada, this reading of the judgment would suggest, I think, a very different
foundation for the creativity requirement than that upon which O’Connor J had
relied in the Feist decision.28
*
3. CCH AT THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL: “NOT COPIED” AND THE
LABOUR-REWARD MODEL
3.1. Defining Originality: Independently Produced
THE RULING ON THE MEANING of originality at the Federal Court of Appeal was,
in my opinion, more problematic than the Trial Division’s ruling. According to
25. See Jane Ginsburg, “Creation and Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information” (1990) 90
Columbia Law Review 1865 at pp. 1881-1888, discussing personality, individuality and authorship.
26. CCH (FCTD), supra note 10 at para. 131, quoting Décary JA in Tele-Direct, supra note 5 at pp. 37-38. 
27. The focus upon the search for a “genuine author” raises concerns about the romanticization of the author-
figure in copyright. Copyright’s construction of the romantic author has been the subject of critique in
some wonderful copyright scholarship over the last few years. See e.g. Peter Jaszi, “On the Author Effect:
Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity” (1991) 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
293.    
28. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Linden JA, the trial judge had “failed to conduct any substantive analysis of the
American standard of originality,” and thereby “entangled the standard set out
in Feist … with the Canadian touchstone of originality.”29 Justice Linden’s ruling
emptied the originality concept of virtually all meaning, reducing the central
requirement of copyrightability to the mere proposition that original works
originate from the author.30
The standard as articulated is over-inclusive, and the scope of copyright
protection is potentially widened well beyond the kind of intellectual
productions that require protection in furtherance of copyright’s goals.  A
random, irrational compilation displaying no skill or judgment or knowledge in
its selection or arrangement would be protected unless it could be shown to
have been copied from another work.31 There is, in this sense, no actual
“standard” to be met; anything worth copying is worth protecting, and the only
“sweat” required is the effort it takes to distinguish a work from a mere copy.32
Under this view, originality determinations involve no consideration of the
attributes of the work or the processes undertaken in its production, but are
purely concerned with the existence of a single originating source. 
3.2. The Purposes of Copyright: 
Lowering Originality and Rewarding Producers 
Interestingly, the copyright policy articulated by Linden JA also differs quite
significantly from that espoused by Gibson J at the trial level. The Court of
29. CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 52. 
30. Ibid. at para. 53: “It is widely accepted that an ‘original’ work must be independently produced and not
copied.… [D]ifferent judges and commentators have described the word ‘original’ with a host of words and
phrases mentioned above, including various combinations of the terms ‘labour’, judgment’, ‘skill’, ‘work’,
‘industry’, ‘effort’, ‘taste’, or ‘discretion’ ….To me, these are all possible ingredients in the recipe for
originality, which may be altered to suit the flavour of the work at issue.…[I]t is a mistake to treat any of
these words as if they were statutory requirements. These are not, in themselves, prerequisites to copyright
protection, but rather evidence of the sole prerequisite, originality.”
31. Contrast this position with the ruling of the House of Lords in G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd v Frank Smythson
Ltd [1944] A.C. 329, [1944] 2 All ER 92 (HL) [Cramp cited to A.C.], where the court refused protection to a
diary prefix. Lord McMillan opined: “The inclusion or exclusion of one or more of the tables constituting
the ordinary stock material of the diary-compiler seems to me to involve the very minimum of labour and
judgement…. [I]f any compilation could be held to fall short of displaying the qualities requisite to attract
copyright, the respondent’s collection of seven tables is such a one.” Ibid. at p. 338. It seems to me that a
court applying Justice Linden’s originality standard would have been bound to uphold copyright protection
in the work at issue in Cramp, because while the tables were of the type commonly found in diary prefixes,
there was no evidence to suggest that this selection and seemingly random arrangement of tables had
been copied from any other particular source. When the only standard is “not copied,” then a work should
only fail to meet that standard if it can be shown to be derived from pre-existing work. This reveals the
manner in which Justice Linden’s standard may depart even from the minimalist “sweat of the brow”
position taken by the UK courts. If a work is not copied, nothing further is required–not even labour, which,
according to Justice Linden, will “normally” (but not necessarily) be present when a work is not copied.
See CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 54, where the language suggests that there may be works that are
devoid of any intellectual effort but that are more than simple copies; presumably, a pure not-copied test
would protect such works. Compare this to Justice Rothstein’s standard, ibid. at paras. 214-218, which
envisages some investment of some additional “intellectual effort”, however that may be defined.     
32. Compare University of London Press, Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at p. 610 [University
of London Press cited to Ch.]: “[A]fter all, there remains the rough practical test that what is worth copying is
prima facie worth protecting.” Per Peterson J. This case is widely cited as the original authority for a minimalist
originality threshold. The court held, at pp. 608-609: “The word ‘original’ does not in this connection mean
that the work must be the expression of original or inventive thought.… The originality which is required relates
to the expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or
novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work–that it should originate from the author.”
The Court of Appeal in CCH cited this case with approval (supra note 12 at para. 30).
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Appeal began its analysis from the position that:
[T]he purposes of Canadian copyright law are to benefit authors by granting
them a monopoly for a limited time, and to simultaneously encourage the
disclosure of works for the benefit of society at large.… The person who sows
must be allowed to reap what is sown, but the harvest must ensure that
society is not denied some benefit from the crops. …The challenge
facing…copyright law generally…is to find a fair and appropriate equilibrium
that achieves both goals.33
This was in line with the most recent articulation by the Supreme Court
on the matter of copyright’s purposes. In the decision of Théberge v. Galerie
D’Art du Petit Champlain Inc.,34 the position of the Supreme Court had shifted
away from its previous author-orientated approach and toward the idea that
copyright involves a balance between two sets of interests, namely:
a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for
the creator….The proper balance among these and other public policy
objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due
weight to their limited nature. In interpreting the Copyright Act, courts should
strive to maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals.35
The question becomes whether the adoption of this policy goal played
a significant role in the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of originality; was it
somehow the search for an appropriate equilibrium between copyright’s two
purposes that resulted in the polar opposite approach to originality? In my view,
the answer is no, not quite. In defining originality, the Court of Appeal focused
on only one of the goals set out in Théberge: the need to provide just reward for
the creator. The court noted: “A more onerous standard of originality deprives
owners of the copyright protection that the signatories to these [international]
agreements intended to guarantee. Their purpose is frustrated, rather than
promoted by implying additional requirements of creativity, imagination or
creative spark into the Act.”36
As Daniel Gervais has observed, a focus upon the author is not always in
the interests of those who would claim to be authors.37 A personality-based
notion of authorship may limit the works to which copyright protection extends.
However, an author-oriented approach that defines the author’s rights in terms
of the effort and labour invested will lower the threshold for protection in order
to “prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever
benefits may be generated,” thereby ensuring “just reward.”38 It is notable that
33. CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 23.
34. 2002 SCC 34, <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol2/html/2002scr2_0336.html>,
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 [Théberge cited to LexUM/S.C.R.].
35. Ibid. at paras. 30-31.
36. CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 42.
37. Gervais, supra note 10 at p. 957, noted with reference to the Feist decision: “Putting the author/creator at
the center of the copyright picture by requiring evidence of human (intellectual) creativity does not
necessarily stem from an author-friendly perspective or benefit authors. In fact, the reverse may be true.”
38. Théberge, supra note 34 at para. 30.
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in the above-quoted passage, Linden JA described those who would be denied
copyright protection due to additional creativity requirements as “owners of the
copyright.” This implies that ownership does not flow from creativity, and so
when creativity is required, true “owners” of copyright are denied their
entitlement. Thus, by lowering the threshold of originality from the standard
endorsed by the Trial Judge, Linden JA sought to achieve one of the two goals
identified: ensuring just reward (ownership) for the creator (labourer). This
reward was measured not in relation to the personality invested by the author in
the substance of the work, but in relation to the effort invested in its production.  
So what of the second goal and its implications for originality
determinations? Linden JA wrote:
Admittedly, the public interest in the dissemination of works may be a policy
reason to impose a high standard of “creativity” as a prerequisite to copyright
protection. There is also the concern that overprotection of certain works will
thwart social and scientific progress by precluding persons from building
upon earlier works. However,… a fair interpretation of user rights can
counteract the apparent imbalance potentially generated by a low
threshold…. For example, the fair dealing provisions of the Act provide a
mechanisms [sic.] whereby user rights are better considered.39
Particularly in a Canadian context, reliance upon the fair dealing defence
to strike the appropriate balance is of little comfort to those concerned with the
over-inclusiveness likely to result from the minimal originality standard. Even
acknowledging the court’s improvement upon the explicitly and deliberately
“narrow” interpretations that have characterized judicial consideration of
exceptions in Canada,40 the exceptions are drafted so narrowly that their ability
to further the public interest in dissemination must be doubted. Nor does resort
to fair dealing obviate the arbitrariness and subjectivity that the court associated
with the “creativity” standard: once it has been established that a dealing was
for an enumerated purpose, determinations of “fairness” have been notoriously
arbitrary and subjective. Reliance upon substantial similarity determinations to
strike the appropriate balance may be a more realistic approach, but would still
leave much to be desired.41 More often than not, once the existence of a right in
the work has been established, the defendant who has engaged in an unlicensed
use of the copyrighted work is fighting a losing battle. 
The copyright “balance” is upset when considerations of the public side
of this “balance” are postponed until the private right has been established (and
39. CCH (FCA), supra note 12 at para. 59.
40. Whereas the Trial Division in CCH, in line with Canadian fair dealing jurisprudence at that time, had been
“satisfied that the fair dealing exception should be strictly construed” (supra note 10 at para. 175), the
Supreme Court ruled, supra note 15 at para. 48, that “[i]n order to maintain the proper balance between
the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.” 
41. David Vaver has argued that the attempt to define and apply an “originality” standard has “tended to
divert attention from other possibly more critical issues, such as when … and how far copyright should be
asserted.” David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at p. 63. In a similar vein, Vaver recently
observed that the issue as to how far copyright should be asserted is “particularly critical in Canada, where
the lax test of originality lets almost anything into the pantheon and where the range of defences to
infringement is tightly circumscribed.” Vaver, “Comparative Overview,” supra note 1 at pp. 145-146.
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allegedly infringed). There cannot be sufficient appreciation for the public’s side
of the copyright “balance” when the public interest plays no part in determining
the subsistence of copyright. In effect, this approach reduces the public interest
at stake to the interests of an individual defendant/infringer who has used a
protected work without authorization. The defendant, who apparently embodies
the public interest, is already on the wrong side of a moral equation: he is the
would-be free rider playing opposite the meritorious producer. To limit the
consideration of the public interest to infringement determinations while
excluding it from subsistence determinations both relegates and distorts the
nature of the public interest at stake. If the notion of “balance” between authors’
rights and the public interest is to be taken seriously, the public interest has to
play a critical role in determining the subject matter to which copyright interests
ought to attach. This is the moment at which the work is subjected to the
exclusionary interest and is set apart from the public domain. Clearly at this
stage, perhaps more than any other, the public has interests at stake.          
While the Federal Court of Appeal posited as a starting point the
balance articulated by the Supreme Court in Théberge, it failed to acknowledge
the relevance of the public’s side of that balance in arriving at its definition of
originality. With this side of the balance neglected, the only relevant purpose
remaining was that of protecting the author’s reward, and thus ensuring that the
author reaped what was sown. Consequently, the originality threshold was
lowered to the point of virtual irrelevance, creating a real—and not merely
“apparent”—imbalance in favour of the author’s right (presented as a reward for
the investment of labour). Such an imbalance cannot not be justified or rectified
simply by appealing to the limits of copyright infringement. 
*
4. CCH AT THE SUPREME COURT: 
“SKILL AND JUDGMENT” AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
4.1. Defining Originality: “Between these Extremes”
THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT JUDGMENT in the CCH case provides a new (or at
least clarified) standard for originality that requires an independent production
involving skill and judgment. It is my opinion that this standard is more suitable
than the minimalist, all-encompassing test adopted by the Federal Court of
Appeal. However, as the history of the originality doctrine displays, sometimes
the particular words used to define its meaning are far less important than the
policy reasons that inform its application. Notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s
attempt to ascribe meaning to “skill” and “judgment”,42 these words remain
inherently vague, and necessarily open to subjective interpretation on a case-by-
case basis. In attempts to interpret and apply the CCH standard, then, courts will
have to appeal to the relevant policy considerations as they were articulated in
McLachlin CJ’s judgment. Perhaps the most important implication of the ruling
42. See supra note 16. 
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on originality flows not from the particular formulation of the standard, but rather
from the acknowledgement that “the public interest in promoting the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect”43 is a
relevant consideration in the determination of copyrightability. 
Like Linden JA, McLachlin CJ accepted the copyright balance as
formulated in Théberge; but the difference is that she went on to apply the
balance as a framework within which to assess the meaning of originality:
When courts adopt a standard of originality requiring only that something be
more than a mere copy or that someone simply show industriousness to
ground copyright in a work, they tip the scale in favour of the author’s or
creator’s rights, at the loss of society’s interest in maintaining a robust public
domain that could help foster future creative innovation. … 
[A] “sweat of the brow”…standard…fails to allow copyright to protect the
public’s interest in maximizing the production and dissemination of
intellectual works.44
Having recognized the public interest at stake in the initial
determination of a work’s copyrightability, McLachlin CJ decided that elevating
the minimalist originality standard by endorsing the additional requirement of
skill and judgment would achieve the appropriate balance between the public
interest and that of the author.
4.2. The Purposes of Copyright: Raising the 
Threshold and Protecting the Public Interest 
The importance of the Supreme Court’s earlier articulation of the purposes of
copyright became evident in its subsequent CCH ruling. In CCH, the notion of
balance and the concern for the public interest pervaded the Court’s
interpretation and application of the law; not only with respect to originality, but
also with respect to authorization and fair dealing. In the originality sphere, the
acknowledgement of a relevant public interest and a public goal for copyright
law was a major development, and a desirable departure from the author-
orientated approach of past decisions concerning copyrightability.  
On this basis, I would suggest that the CCH case is to Canada what Feist
is to the US. The comparison is not premised upon the simple fact that CCH
unambiguously rejected an industrious collection standard, as Feist had done
several years earlier. Purely in terms of the test adopted, Tele-Direct would bear
a closer resemblance to Feist. The basis for the analogy is that both courts, in
establishing the meaning of originality, looked beyond the interests of the
purported rights-bearer and made an appeal to the public policy goals of
copyright law. In Feist, having asserted that originality in compilations of data
required “a minimal degree of creativity” in the selection and arrangement,
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43. CCH (SCC), supra note 15 at para. 23.
44. Ibid. at paras. 23 and 24.
45. Feist, supra note 2 at pp. 1289-1290. The Feist decision constitutionalized originality and creativity as
prerequisites to copyright protection. The reasoning was based on the court’s interpretation of “writings”
and “authors” in the US Constitution and the result was justified in terms of the “progress” clause. See
David Lange, “Sensing the Constitution in Feist” (1992) 17 University of Dayton Law Review 367 at  p. 373:
“Congress is empowered to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors for limited times solely in order
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. This is the constitutional standard, the Court has
said [in Feist], and the standard constrains; its limits cannot properly be avoided through the simple device
of calling authorship (read: appropriation) by another name.”  
46. CCH (SCC), supra note 15 at para. 23. 
O’Connor J addressed the public purposes of copyright:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used
by others without compensation. …It is, rather, “the essence of
copyright”…and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts”.…To this end, copyright assures authors the right
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work.”45
Similarly, in CCH, McLachlin CJ justified the higher originality standard
by way of a similar appeal to the public interest at stake:
[W]hen an author must exercise skill and judgment to ground originality in a
work, there is a safeguard against the author being overcompensated for his
or her work. This helps ensure that there is room for the public domain to
flourish as others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas and
information contained in the works of others.46
Whereas the originality debate in Canada had previously been framed in
terms of the search for the deserving author (the meritorious producer of
something worthy of protection), the CCH case adopts an approach similar to
that of the US Supreme Court: the meaning of originality is to be determined
with a view to the primary objective(s) of copyright law, which necessitates
consideration of the public interest and the appropriate limits of private
appropriation. This kind of openly purposive, policy-infused analysis of a
copyright concept represents a significant departure from previous Canadian
jurisprudence, which tended to reify these concepts, thereby denying their
inherently malleable, and so political, nature.  
*
5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CCH FOR ORIGINALITY 
AND CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
5.1. Defining Originality: Regarding the New Standard
THERE IS, OF COURSE, much more that could be and should be said about the
version of originality that finally emerged from the CCH case. After years of
confusion and contradiction, Canada finally has a definitive statement from the
Supreme Court about the meaning of the originality doctrine in Canadian
copyright law. However, as I have suggested, certainty about the particular test
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to be applied hardly guarantees certainty in the manner or consequences of its
application.47 The real impact of the decision, then, will be revealed in the policy
considerations evoked by courts in future originality cases, and the extent to
which the stated policies do in fact inform the application of the standard. 
I am hopeful that the concept of balance between authors’ reward and
public interest, as propounded in Théberge and developed in CCH, will provide
a revitalizing framework for assessing current controversies in the originality
debate. Thus, for example, in the policy dilemma surrounding database
protection (a controversy that will undoubtedly be reignited in the wake of this
ruling), a concern for the public interest will ensure appreciation of the need for
the dissemination of information and the freedom to build upon it. The
unavoidable question of whether databases should receive protection, and if so
to what extent, must therefore be answered in the context of the various policy
considerations at stake, and not simply against the backdrop of a desire or
perceived need to reward the labour, time or investment of a compiler/author or
to prevent its “misappropriation.”48
However, it is important to stress that the real implications of this
development in the originality context have yet to be seen. The subject matter
at issue in the CCH case does not present the degree of controversy that will
inevitably be encountered elsewhere. For one thing, most people will likely
agree that a “minimal degree of creativity test” should have been capable of
attributing originality and extending protection to the works at issue in CCH. The
larger point, however, is that the works at issue in CCH were not of the type
involved in the Feist, Tele-Direct, or the Australian Telstra49 decisions. It will be
interesting to see what happens to the balance sought by the CCH originality
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47. David Vaver, supra note 1 at p. 145, has noticed that agreement about the appropriate copyrightability
standard does not lead to consistent results, whether across courts or across different categories of work:
“In practice, the theory of homogeneity breaks down, if only because the question of how rigorously to
test compilations for originality is itself a source of continuing disagreement within the United States itself.
The same work might be protected in one circuit but denied protection in another.” 
48. For an interesting discussion of the database dilemma in the Canadian context, see David Freedman,
“Revising Canadian Database Protection: What Lessons from Europe?” (2002) 82 Canadian Bar Review
253. Freedman argues, at p. 578, that copyright doctrine in Canada “reveals an uncertain and inconsistent
level of protection of databases through artificial construction of the core question of originality, made
worse at times by a liberal sprinkling of legal fictions,” and further, that “the present proprietary models do
not adequately speak to either the economic justification for protection of databases as copyrightable
works, nor do they provide an adequate structure to balance competing interests in respect of such
works.” 
49. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd., 2002 FCAFC 112,
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2002/112.html>, 119 F.C.R. 491, 192 A.L.R. 433 [Desktop
cited to AustLII]. The Australian Federal Court of Appeal in this decision held that copyright subsisted in
the White Pages and Yellow Pages telephone directories at issue. Per Sackville JA at paras. 438-439: “The
listing information incorporated in Telstra’s directories satisfies the requirement of originality because of the
labour and expense involved in the compilation. The originality of the compilation for copyright purposes
does not lie in the prosaic method of presentation of the data…. Once it is accepted that the originality in
Telstra’s compilations lies in the labour and expense involved in compiling the information, the primary
Judge was right to conclude that Desktop had taken a substantial part of each of Telstra’s copyright works.
It is not to the point that Desktop may not have adopted Telstra’s mode of presentation of the data.”
Arguments based upon Feist were refused on the basis that the US Supreme Court’s definition of
originality was informed by the particularities of the US law and not least, by the “purposive element” in
the US Constitution (see paras. 421-422). Leave to appeal was refused due to insufficient prospects for
success.  One might be forgiven for wondering whether the Canadian Supreme Court would have arrived
at a similar standard to that adopted in Telstra if faced with a similar scenario: one in which a “skill and
judgment” test would have denied protection to the product of industrious collection.   
50. See e.g. Robertson, supra note 10 at para. 136: “[T]his assertion…[that a ruling in favour of the plaintiff will
result in havoc for researchers deprived of access to historical newspaper texts]…cannot be an answer to an
unlawful infringement upon authors’ copyrights, if such exists. Arguably, any infringement of copyright might
well inure to society’s benefit by allowing for the greater dissemination of information and ideas. However,
the recognition of copyright mediates between a number of competing individual and societal interests, not
the least of which is to afford the protection of the law to authors of original [individual], literary works.”
51. CCH (SCC), supra note 15 at para. 48. 
52. Feist, supra note 2. Guy Pessach,  “The Legacy of Feist Revisited—A Critical Analysis of the Creativity
Requirement” (2002) 36 Israel Law Review 19 at p. 43, explained the Feist standard in light of the “public-
oriented justification of copyright in American law”: underlying the Court’s decision was “the conviction
that the requirement of creativity was the correct and desired way to implement copyright’s policy of
encouragement, and thus achieve the optimal result for promoting the public interest.”
53. CCH (SCC), supra note 15 at para. 23.
standard when a court is faced with allowing the unlicensed extraction of
substantial amounts of information for commercial purposes from a garden-
variety compilation of data, laboriously collected. Such a scenario will present the
real challenge involved in striking the balance between rewarding author-
compilers and disseminating information for the public interest. 
5.2. The Purposes of Copyright: Regarding the Concept of “Balance”
With two goals to further in the pursuit of copyright’s purposes, one must
wonder whether, at a certain point, a choice will have to be made. Historically,
when faced with such choices, Canadian courts have erred in favour of protecting
authors’ rights.50 Admittedly, now that the Supreme Court has accepted the
concept of “users’ rights”,51 the claim to an author’s “right” might not be as
conclusory as it has been in the past. The debate can potentially be re-conceived
in terms of a “clash of rights,” rather than the traditional “right as trump.”
However, the question must still be asked: which right will prevail when the
balance (or the illusion thereof) can no longer be convincingly maintained?
This question highlights the vulnerability intrinsic to the Théberge
balancing act, as well as revealing a crucial point of divergence between the
reasoning in Feist and CCH. To reiterate: in Feist, the refusal to protect facts in a
compilation was not “unfair or unfortunate” for the compiler, but was the very
means by which copyright advanced its “primary objective,” which was not to
reward authors but to promote progress.52 By way of contrast, in CCH,
copyright’s objective was to promote the encouragement and dissemination of
works and to obtain a just reward for the creator.53 Copyright has two goals.
While, following the US approach, the author’s private rights are ultimately a
means to secure a public end, in the Canadian context, the author’s rights are at
once a means to an end and an end in themselves. Indeed, when the US courts
speak of the copyright balance, the nature of that balance differs significantly
from the Canadian copyright balance established in CCH. The US copyright
balance is internal to the public interest: it requires courts to establish whether
the public interest in promoting progress of the useful arts has shifted from
demanding the recognition of the author’s copyright to necessitating its refusal.
On one hand, recognition of a copyright interest will presumably incentivize the
production of such works to the ultimate benefit of the public. On the other
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hand, refusing copyright protection will allow the work to be freely accessed and
disseminated, thereby also serving the public interest. Within this framework, the
question is not how one balances the conflicting interests of the public on one
hand and the owner on the other, but how one achieves a balance between
protection and the public domain that will serve the interests of society at large.54
This is in contrast to the balancing act described in Théberge, which appears to
leave intact the notion of the author’s right to reap the rewards of her intellectual
effort, with the caveat that these rights will be subject to necessary limitations
when balanced against the relevant public interests.55
It is worth remembering that the idea of “balancing” competing interests
is no more than a metaphor itself, albeit one that is a pervasive and persuasive
presence in modern legal discourse.56 It seems clear that competing interests
cannot simply be weighed or balanced in an ideological vacuum: they have no
intrinsic weight and there exists no essential scale by which to measure them.
Undeniably, “[t]he ‘weight’ of an interest varies according to the objective in
view.”57 Is it enough, then, to say that our objective is to achieve a balance, or does
that merely beg the question: a balance by what measure? If the overarching value
or ideal that underlies Canadian copyright law and by which the balance is gauged
remains the protection and promotion of authors’ rights to a “just reward,” then
less weight will be attributed to the public interest in the access and dissemination
of intellectual products than to the owners’ rights in the copyright balance. As
David Freedman has observed, “the balancing exercise is unhelpfully complicated
by the automatic entitlements that flow necessarily from a proprietary approach.”58
With the natural rights theory of copyright law escaping any serious
critique, we may therefore ask whether the Canadian balancing approach is truly
equipped to generate the kind of outcome reached in Feist, where the existence
of a copyright interest was dependent upon, and so made subject to, the
requirements of progress for the benefit of the public. McLachlin CJ appeared to
be satisfied that the exclusory application of a higher threshold for originality,
established in the name of the public interest, could be consistent with a natural
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54. Jeremy Waldron has explained this nicely: “The point is not merely that the individual rights of authors
must be balanced against the social good. The Constitution stipulates that authors’ rights are created to
serve the social good, so any balancing must be done within the overall context of the public good, i.e.,
between the specific aspect of the public good that is served by intellectual property (‘the Progress of
Science and useful Arts’) and other aspects of the public good such as the progressive effects of the free
circulation of ideas.” Jeremy Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841 at pp. 848-849 (emphasis in original). 
55. I have argued elsewhere that the Théberge decision, while acknowledging the relevance of public interest
concerns, does not depart in any meaningful way from the assumption that copyright is a means of
protecting an author’s natural right in the product of their intellectual labour. See Carys Craig, “Labour and
Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen’s
Law Journal 1 at notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
56. For an interesting discussion of the copyright balance as metaphor, see Alan Story, “Burn Berne: Why the
Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed” (2003) 40 Houston Law Review 763 at pp.
785-793. 
57. R.W.M. Dias, “The Value of a Value-Study of Law” (1965) 28 Modern Law Review 397 at p. 400 cited in
ibid. at p. 793.
58. Freedman, supra note 48 at p. 576, goes on to quote Harvey S. Perleman, “Taking the Protection-Access
Tradeoff Seriously” (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1831 at p. 1834: “In the contest between property
rights and access rights, property rights have the home field advantage. The incentives created by
property rights are clear and the rhetoric is powerful.”
rights-based copyright theory.59 Whether this can play out in practice, however,
remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, Canada’s approach to the database protection
controversy is one area in which the inevitable tension between copyright’s “dual
goals” will manifest itself, requiring a resolution. The nature of that resolution will
be determined by the weight attributed to each goal in the balance; the weight
of these goals will be determined by the theoretical or justificatory principles that
guide the balancer.  
*
6. CONCLUSION
6.1. The More Things Change, the More they Remain the Same: Parallels
Between Walter v. Lane and CCH
THE VARIOUS LINES OF REASONING about originality in the CCH case not only
encapsulate the dynamics that have shaped Canadian originality jurisprudence,
but also reflect the tensions that have subsisted in the originality doctrine
throughout its history. In the classic originality case of Walter v. Lane,60 the
judgments of the five Lords seemed to reveal three divergent theoretical
approaches underlying the determination of originality in the verbatim report of
a public speech: an authorship model, a labour model and a public interest
model.61 Arguably, these different paradigms mirror in large part the conflicting
approaches that we have seen in the Canadian cases, and in CCH in particular.    
In Walter, Lord Robertson decided that the plaintiff’s work was not
original on the basis of the meaning attributed to the term “author.”62 The same
concern for defining “authorship” informed the reasoning of Lord James,
although it led to the opposite conclusion.63 Arguably, a parallel can be drawn
between this ‘authorship model’ and the reasoning employed by the Tele-Direct
court and the Trial Division in the CCH case, where the meaning of originality was
59. See CCH (SCC), supra note 15 at para. 15. McLachlin CJC observed that the “sweat of the brow”
approach to originality was “premised on a natural rights or Lockean theory of ‘just desserts’.” She went on
to suggest that a Feist-like creativity approach was “also consistent with a natural rights theory of property
law; however it is less absolute.”
60. Supra note 10. The work at issue in the case was a stenographer’s report of a public speech delivered by
Lord Rosebery. The House of Lords ruled, 4-1, that copyright could subsist in the verbatim report, and that
the reporter was the author of the report for the purposes of copyright law. 
61. I am grateful to Abraham Drassinower for this insight into the Walter decision. For an excellent discussion
of Walter v. Lane as an instance of the struggle between misappropriation and authorship, see Abraham
Drassinower, “Sweat of the Brow, Creativity, and Authorship: On Originality in Canadian Copyright Law”
(2003-2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 105, <www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol1.1-2/2003-
2004.1.1-2.uoltj.Drassinower.105-123.pdf> at pp. 112-116.
62. Supra note 10 at p. 562: “The word ‘author’…seems to me to present a criterion consistent with the widest
application of the Act to all who can claim as embodying their own thought, whether humble or lofty, the
letterpress of which they assert the authorship.” [Emphasis added] On this basis, to award copyright to the
stenographer would be “to confer on the stenographer a reward which has no relation whatever to his
art.”
63. Ibid. at p. 553: “[T]he report of the speech is something different from and beyond the speech, and the
question to be solved is whether this difference represents a something of which any one can be regarded
as ‘the author’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.” Lord James concluded, somewhat surprisingly, at
p. 555: “[A] reporter of a speech under the conditions existing in this case is the meritorious producer of
the something necessary to constitute him an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”
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derived from the demands of genuine authorship. In contrast, the Earl of
Halsbury chose to avoid using the word “author” to describe the producer of the
work in light of the “confusion” it would cause.64 He spoke instead of the need
to prevent one man from appropriating and profiting from another’s labour.65
The industriousness standard for originality espoused by Lord Davey was
similarly underpinned by the desire to ensure that the plaintiff was permitted to
reap what he had sown.66 Here, a parallel can be drawn between the approach
of Lords Halsbury and Davey and the minimalist standard arrived at by the
Federal Court of Appeal in CCH and other Canadian “sweat of the brow” cases,
which looked for deserving effort and not meritorious authorship as the basis for
protection.67
Taking a third tact, Lord Brampton  in Walter v. Lane appeared to lend
some credence to authorship and labour considerations, but ultimately arrived at
the conclusion that the work was original by making reference to the public
interest at stake. It would appear from Lord Brampton’s line of reasoning that he
found the work to be original because the report furthered access to, and
dissemination of, the speech. In other words, recognizing the public benefits of
having reporters take down truthful records of public speeches meant awarding
copyright protection to the writers engaged in this worthwhile activity.68 Lord
Brampton’s approach to the originality question can be roughly aligned with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in CCH: the title of “author” and the label “original” are
to be attributed not simply on the basis of an assessment of the processes of
production—the degree of authorship or effort displayed—but flow at least in
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64. Ibid. at p. 547: “[T]he judgement of the Court of Appeal [denying copyright] rests solely on the use of the
word ‘author’, and I cannot help thinking that some confusion has been created between two very different
things: one, the proprietary right of every man in his own literary composition; and the other the copyright,
that is to say, the exclusive privilege of making copies created by statute. …The question here is solely
whether this book…can be copied by some one else than the producers of it (I avoid the use of the word
‘author’)….”
65. Ibid. at p. 545: “I should very much regret it if I were compelled to come to the conclusion that the state of
the law permitted one man to make profit and to appropriate to himself the labour, skill, and capital of
another. And it is not denied that in this case the defendant seeks to appropriate to himself what has been
produced by the skill, labour and capital of others. In the view I take of this case I think the law is strong
enough to restrain what to my mind would be a grievous injustice.”
66. Ibid. at p. 552: “[I]t is a sound principle that a man shall not avail himself of another’s skill, labour and
expense by copying the written product thereof. To quote the language of North J. in another case: ‘For
the purposes of their own profit they desire to reap where they have not sown, and to take advantage of
the labour and expenditure of the plaintiffs in procuring news for the purpose of saving labour and
expense to themselves.’”
67. Perhaps most notable is the case of British Columbia Jockey Club v. Standen (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 467, 8
C.P.R. (3d) 283, (BC CA) [Standen cited to C.P.R.], in which the use of horse-racing information from the
plaintiff’s work, albeit presented in a different form, amounted to copyright infringement. The B.C. Court of
Appeal approved the Trial Judge’s reliance upon an authority to the effect that: “The true principle in all
these [compilation] cases is that the defendant is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which
the plaintiff has been at for the purpose of producing his work; that is, in fact, merely to take away the
result of another man’s labour or, in other words, his property.” Ibid. at p. 470 citing Hugh Laddie, Peter
Prescott & Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright (London: Butterworths, 1980) at para. 2.65, citing
Hogg v. Scott (1874), Eq. 444 at p. 485.  
68. Walter v. Lane, supra note 10 at p. 559: “Without [the reporter’s] brain and handiwork the book would
never have had existence, and the words of Lord Rosebery would have remained unrecorded save in the
memories of the comparatively few who were present on those occasions… [B]y [the publication of the
report] in The Times the thousands of the readers of that journal might be truthfully and accurately
informed of those intellectual and interesting utterances of Lord Rosebery which they had not been
privileged to hear. I think, for the reasons I have given, that the proprietors of The Times have copyright in
the article and reports in question.”
part from consideration of the public interest served by protecting the work.69
However, Lord Brampton’s approach to originality in Walter also
highlights the central conundrum of a public interest analysis in copyright law:
while protecting the work might have encouraged the accurate recording of
important speeches in the interest of the public, refusing protection would have
further increased dissemination by allowing publication of the reported speech
in the defendant’s book.70 Lord Brampton did not address this second
component of the public interest. This additional, neglected consideration
demonstrates the need for the balancing act that I have described as “internal”
to the public interest. If we are going to do justice to the idea of public interest
that has at last been introduced into Canada’s originality jurisprudence, we must
be willing to challenge the traditional assumption of the Canadian courts that
awarding protection ultimately, if indirectly, furthers the public interest. Taking
the public interest seriously means acknowledging that there will be occasions
when protecting the socially useful results of an individual’s effort, intellectual or
otherwise, does not serve the interests of the public, and that on such occasions
copyright protection should be denied. The Supreme Court’s ruling in CCH
represents an important step in this direction, and it is critical that Canadian
courts follow suit by giving due weight and consideration to the public side of
the copyright equation.         
6.2. Summary—The Purposes of Copyright and the Evolution of Originality 
The development of Canada’s originality standard over the past few years has
unfolded against a shifting theoretical background. While, in the foreground,
controversy has focused on the creativity and industriousness debate, copyright
theory and policy in Canada has also undergone significant development. The
interest that the public has in the protection of copyright—in who and what is
protected and how much—has been recognized not simply as a secondary and
incidental benefit potentially derivable from the enforcement of authors’ rights,
but as a primary goal of the copyright system. 
Until the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in CCH, originality
determinations in Canada were overwhelmingly concerned with how to
understand, identify and protect authors’ rights. The conflict between the
creativity standard and the “sweat of the brow” standard was fought on the basis
of differing conceptions of the author’s entitlement; in particular, the outcome
depended upon whether a court favoured a personality-based or a labour-based
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69. Compare Drassinower, supra note 61. According to Drassinower, ibid. at p. 123, the Supreme Court’s ruling
in CCH is “best grasped as a vindication of Lord Robertson’s authorship standpoint.” In my opinion, this
reading of the “skill and judgment” standard understates the importance accorded in CCH to the public
interest as a factor capable of limiting copyrightability and restricting the scope of the author’s entitlement.
Among the five judgments in Walter v. Lane, only Lord Brampton’s ruling is capable of capturing this
crucial aspect of the Supreme Court’s originality standard. 
70. This is especially compelling when one recalls that both the reporter and “The Times” already have a
commercial incentive to accurately report the speech to the public: the reporter, because he is paid by
“The Times” to do so, and “The Times” because its success as a daily newspaper depends upon its ability
to provide such reports. Any need for an incentive created through the vehicle of copyright law can be
more convincingly identified in relation to the defendant in the case: the party who would compile a book
of Lord Rosebery’s “Appreciations and Addresses” and make the complete collection available to the
public in a detailed and accessible form.  
understanding of authors’ rights. Notwithstanding the possible limitations or
weaknesses inherent in the Théberge balancing act, the Supreme Court’s ruling
in CCH has situated the debate about the meaning of originality squarely within
the newly acknowledged public policy purposes of the copyright system. As
such, the appropriate originality threshold is to be determined not only with the
author’s interests in mind, but also taking into account the public interest that is
at stake when exclusive rights are granted over intellectual works. This approach
offers a new and substantially more nuanced framework within which to develop
copyright policy, beginning with questions about the kind of subject matter that
copyright will protect and, of course, the suitable limits of that protection. 
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